











Exchange Rate Determination Under Monetary Policy 
Rules in a Financially Underdeveloped Economy: A 
















 Exchange Rate Determination Under Monetary Policy Rules
in a Financially Underdeveloped Economy: A Simple Model
and Application to Mozambique∗
Shakill Hassan†and Félix Simione‡
September 29, 2010
Abstract
Microstructure aspects of nominal exchange rate determination are less relevant in countries
with embryonic ﬁnancial markets. In less-developed economies, trade in goods and services is a
more signiﬁcant driver of currency demand than ﬁnancial market speculation or hedging; and
central banks actively set monetary variables. We develop a simple variation of the standard
monetary model of exchange rate determination, incorporating interest rate rules but not relying
on interest rate parity; and study the eﬀect of monetary fundamentals on the Mozambican
exchange rate. We ﬁnd a long-run relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates, with
coeﬃcient signs in regression equations consistent with theoretic predictions. Moreover, the
monetary model outperforms a random walk in predicting metical exchange rates out-of-sample
at the four-quarter horizon.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Motivation
Standard models of exchange rate determination based on macroeconomic variables, such as price
levels, aggregate output, money supply, etc., and henceforth referred to as monetary models, perform
worse than a simple martingale in forecasting developed countries’ exchange rates out-of-sample,
over short and medium-term horizons (Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983), Frankel and Rose (1995), Lyons
(2001)). The evidence on the ability of standard monetary models to explain and forecast exchange
rates over very long horizons (about sixteen quarters ahead) is better, but mixed and inconclusive
(Nelson (1995), Chen and Chou (2008)).1
The existing evidence is overwhelmingly based on the analysis of heavily traded currencies from
either advanced or emerging economies with developed ﬁnancial systems. For such currencies, the
large volume of currency trading — an average of over three trillion dollars traded per day in the
global currency markets by 2007 (Bank of International Settlements (2007)) — can only be explained
by micro-structure eﬀects (currency market participants’ trading behaviour due to speculative and
hedging demand), and it seems unlikely that simple monetary models can fully explain exchange rate
oscillation. (See Lyons (2001).) Less-developed economies are characterised by embryonic ﬁnancial
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referee for helpful comments and/or discussions. Responsibility for any errors rests entirely with the authors, of course.
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1Note that the empirical evidence against monetary models relies heavily on the models’ ability to perform bet-
ter than a random walk in forecasting the exchange rate. Alternative model evaluation criteria can lead to more
encouraging results. See Engel, Mark and West (2007).
1markets which are only partly integrated with international ﬁnancial markets.2 Demand for currency
is driven largely by trade in goods and services, rather than currency speculation and hedging. This
setting leads to comparatively infrequent currency movements (though the magnitude of movements
can be large due to the high price impact of trades), so macroeconomic fundamentals may play a
more signiﬁcant role in the determination of exchange rates — provided we do not rely on the interest
parity conditions ubiquitous in the literature.
Moreover, developing-country central banks are responsible for achieving and maintaining macro-
economic stability, leading to an active role in setting monetary variables, analogous to the Taylor
rule-following central banks in more advanced economies. (See Calvo (2007).) Recent research points
to an improvement in the performance of macroeconomic exchange rate models when central banks
are assumed to set the interest rate in response to the inﬂation and output gaps (plus, in some
cases, the real exchange rate) — rather than treating money supply as an exogenous variable, as is
typically done in monetary models. (Engel and West (2006); Engel, Mark and West (2007); and
Mark (2009).) So far, this promising research produced models only of the real exchange rate, relies
centrally on uncovered interest parity, and has not been applied to a developing-country setting.
1.2 Background: assumptions of the standard monetary model
The standard monetary model consists of three relationships: money market equilibrium; purchas-
ing power parity (PPP, henceforth); and uncovered interest parity (UIP, henceforth).3 The ﬁrst is
a basic domestic equilibrium relationship. The open-economy element comes from the second and
third relationships. The second, PPP, postulates the exchange rate to be such that the prices of
homogeneous goods in the domestic and foreign market are equalised when expressed in a common
currency and subject to transaction costs. The third relationship, UIP, equates the interest diﬀeren-
tial to the expected depreciation of the domestic currency over the term of the bonds or deposits to
which the interest rates apply.4 Under perfect foresight it is an arbitrage relationship, such that if
it fails there would be unexploited proﬁts in the international bond markets. (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1996).)
The evidence on PPP is mixed. Although strongly rejected as a continuously holding relationship,
it is generally regarded as a valid long-term indication of central tendencyf o rt h ee x c h a n g er a t e .
(See for example Sarno and Taylor (2002), chapter 3.) Since goods prices take longer to adjust
than securities prices, in principle, PPP should not be expected to hold in the short term. For
Mozambique, PPP is supported by existing evidence on the extent and speed of exchange rate
pass-through (to domestic prices). (Vicente (2007), Cirera and Nhate (2009).) These ﬁndings
are consistent with existing studies supporting PPP in less-developed countries, especially in high-
inﬂation economies (Holmes (2000)); and with Mozambique’s large share of imported goods in
domestic demand.
Theoretically, uncovered interest parity ought to apply in the short as well as long term. Indeed,
it should hold continuously. In practice, it does not. There is some evidence supporting UIP over
very long (ten-year) horizons and between currencies and long-term bonds traded in deep and ﬂuid
internationally integrated ﬁnancial markets. (Chinn and Meredith (2004).) But the overwhelming
evidence on UIP as a short to medium-term relationship ﬁrmly rejects the hypothesis. (Flood
and Rose (2002), Chinn (2006), Bergman and Hassan (2008).) 5 More recent studies turn to
2This is the case in most of Africa, and the less-developed economies in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe.
Average monthly turnover in Mozambique’s interbank foreign exchange market is less than 100 million US dollars
(Banco de Moçambique, Boletim Mensal de Conjuntura, 2009).
3The standard monetary model was introduced by Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976). Standard textbook treatments
include Frankel and Rose (1995), and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀf (1996), chapter 8.
4According to UIP, currency depreciation is expected if the domestic interest rate exceeds the foreign interest rate;
and appreciation is expected if the diﬀerential is negative.
5To illustrate the extent of the failure, consider the evidence in Flood and Rose (2002), who look at short-horizon
UIP using high-frequency data from 21 countries during the main crisis episodes of the 1990s. The slope coeﬃcient
2the proﬁtability of trading strategies designed to exploit deviations from UIP. These strategies
yield particularly attractive returns when applied to emerging markets — compared to industrialised
countries. (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007); Hassan and Smith (2009).)
That PPP enjoys some support in less-developed economies, while UIP is only supported (for
suﬃciently long horizons) among higher-income economies, should not be surprising. UIP is an asset
market (quasi-) arbitrage relationship, relying on ﬂuid and deep ﬁnancial markets. PPP is driven
by trade in goods. The latter can be the main driver of currency transactions in less-developed
countries, but accounts for only a very small share of currency trading in developed markets. (See
Lyons (2001).)
1.3 Contribution
In the case of ﬁnancially under-developed low-income economies, interest parity is neither an em-
pirical fact nor a realistic assumption from a theoretic viewpoint. (See Aron and Ayogu (1997).)
Domestic and foreign assets are nowhere near perfect substitutability; currency and ﬁxed-income
markets are illiquid. The ﬁnancial markets are rudimentary and largely isolated from international
portfolio investment ﬂows; and the arbitrage-based theoretic motivation for interest parity conditions
is inapplicable. Hence, from the standard monetary model (Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976), Frankel
and Rose (1995)), we assume only money market equilibrium and PPP.
In the standard model, monetary policy is exogenous — interest rates adjust to equate money
supply to money demand. In reality, central banks worldwide respond to the evolution of macroeco-
nomic fundamentals when, and by, setting the short-term rate — especially in response to deviations
of inﬂation and output growth from targets (or target bands). (Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998).)
This paper adds to the recent literature linking interest rate rules to exchange rate determination
in three ways. First, we develop a simple theoretical model of the nominal exchange rate, with
symmetric interest rate rules. Second, we do not assume UIP. Given the low-income developing-
country focus of the paper, we consider instead PPP as the international parity condition. Lastly,
we examine empirical exchange rate behaviour in a ﬁnancially underdeveloped economy, namely
Mozambique.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents the analysis and implications of the model, leading to an equation for the nominal
exchange rate. Section 4 begins the empirical analysis, describing the data and performing station-
arity tests. Section 5 presents regression results. Section 6 examines the forecasting performance of
the model. Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains further graphs and details on the data.
2 Setting
Assume money market equilibrium and inﬂation targeting, in both the domestic and foreign economies;
and PPP as the international parity relationship.
2.1 Money Market Equilibrium in Domestic and Foreign Economy
From the conventional LM curve (Keynes-Hicks) we have
Mt
P t
= L(Yt,I t), (1)
where Mt,P t,Y t,a n dIt denote the domestic levels of nominal money supply, the price level, real
output and nominal interest rates, all at t; and L is a demand for real money function. Assume
(in regressions of the interest diﬀerential on exchange rate depreciation, which is equal to 1 if UIP holds) is negative
in twelve cases, essentially zero in two cases, and positive in seven cases. Of the seven positive coeﬃcients, three are
statistically signiﬁcant. None of these three is meaningfully close to 1.
3log-linear Cagan-type money demand
logMt − logPt = φlogYt − ηlogIt, (2)
where φ and η are positive parameters (elasticity of demand for real money balances with respect
to output and interest rates respectively).6 Let m ≡ logM, p ≡ logP, y ≡ logY and I =( 1+i).
Then:
mt − pt = φyt − ηit. (3)
Assume the same relationship to hold in the foreign market, with identical money demand elasticity






describing money market equilibrium in the foreign economy.
2.2 Purchasing Power Parity
Let P∗
t and εt denote, respectively, foreign country prices and the nominal exchange rate, all at t,
with the exchange rate expressed in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. With
ﬂexible real-sector prices, ignoring transaction costs, international quasi-arbitrage in goods markets
requires the cost of an identical basket of goods to command the same price in both countries, when




pt = et + p∗
t, (6)
where and e ≡ logε. Note that we do not assume uncovered interest parity. International parity
stems from trade in goods alone.
2.3 Monetary Policy Rules
Instead of letting the interest rate change to equate money supply and money demand, we assume
that both central banks determine the benchmark short-term interest rate depending on macro-
economic fundamentals. Speciﬁcally, the central bank sets the benchmark nominal interest rate in
response to the deviation of the price level from a target, ρ, and the deviation of output from a target
γ. (Taylor (1993).) For simplicity, the targets are assumed constant and the central bank reacts to
current data. The central bank’s interest rate reaction function is summarised by a standard Taylor
rule (Taylor (1993), Woodford (2003), Engel and West (2006)),
it = α + ξ(pt − ρ)+δ(yt − γ), (7)
where ξ and δ are positive parameters. The foreign central bank follows the analogous rule
i∗
t = α∗ + ξ(p∗
t − ρ∗)+δ(y∗
t − γ∗), (8)
where for convenience we assume equal monetary policy responsiveness parameters ξ and δ (Engel
and West (2006)).
6See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, chapter 10) for the development of the micro-foundations for the standard money
demand model used here.
42.4 Remarks
In the empirical section we will examine the metical-rand and metical-dollar exchange rates. Empiri-
cal research shows that the postulated interest rate rules are valid (implicit) summarised descriptions
of interest rate policy in the United States (Taylor (1993)) and South Africa (Woglom (2003)).
It may be argued the Mozambican monetary authorities only target price stability, not the output
gap.7 In that case, the parameter δ is zero, so the interest rate rule changes to the Wicksellian form
used in Calvo (2007) (Wicksell (1907), Woodford (2003)):
it = α + ξ(pt − ρ). (9)
As we will see, this change aﬀects a coeﬃcient in the exchange rate equation, but not its form nor
the right-hand side variables.
3 Analysis and results
3.1 Standard monetary model without UIP
Assumptions A1 and A2 constitute the standard monetary model without UIP. The ﬁr s tp a r to fo u r
analysis is therefore standard, and included here for completeness. (See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996),
chapter 8.) Subtract (4), the condition for money market equilibrium in the foreign economy, from
(3), the equation for domestic money market equilibrium, to ﬁnd
(mt − m∗
t) − (pt − p∗
t)=φ(yt − y∗




t)=( mt − m∗
t) − φ(yt − y∗
t)+η(it − i∗
t). (11)
Use equation (6), PPP, for (pt − p∗
t)and letft ≡ (mt − m∗
t) − φ(yt − y∗
t). This gives the exchange
rate as a function of two macro “fundamentals”, money and output, and the interest diﬀerential:
et = ft + η(it − i∗
t). (12)
The implications are well-known. An increase in money supply leads to a higher price level, through
money market equilibrium; through PPP the exchange rate depreciates. An increase in real output
raises money demand. Money market equilibrium then requires a decrease in the domestic price
level, causing appreciation through PPP. Finally, an increase in domestic interest rates reduces
money demand, requiring either a reduction in money supply or an increase in the price level, or
both. The increase in domestic prices leads to an increase the exchange rate, through PPP.
3.2 Exchange rate model with an interest rate rule but no UIP
The interest rate rules in the domestic and foreign economies determine the interest diﬀerential.
Thus, if central banks target the inﬂation deviation and the output gap, we have, using (7) and (8),
and letting α = α∗,
(it − i∗
t)=ξ((pt − p∗
t)+( ρ − ρ∗)) + δ((yt − y∗
t) − (γ − γ∗)). (13)






7The primary objective of Mozambique’s central bank is the “preservation of the value of the national cur-
rency/money.” (Authors’ translation of Article 3 of the central bank’s mandate, published in Assembleia da República,
Lei no. 01/92 de 03 de Janeiro.) Since the exchange rate is oﬃcially ﬂexible, we take this to mean the maintenance
of domestic purchasing power.
5Now substitute into the exchange rate equation (12) to obtain
et =( mt − m∗
t) − (φ + ηδ)(yt − y∗
t)+ηξ(pt − p∗
t). (15)
Equation (15) describes the monetary determinants of the nominal exchange rate when both central
banks pursue an interest rate rule (Taylor (1993)), and two building blocks of the standard monetary
model apply, namely, money market equilibrium and PPP. It is, by construction, a model for the
medium to long-term value of the currency, since each assumption can only realistically describe
low-frequency behaviour. It diﬀers from the standard monetary model in two ways. (See Frankel
and Rose (1995), p. 1692.) First, the price diﬀerential is retained as an exchange rate determinant.
Second, the coeﬃcients of the output and price diﬀerentials in the exchange rate equation are driven
by interest rate rule parameters, in addition to the usual elasticity parameters from the money
demand equation.
Ceteris paribus, the exchange rate appreciates if domestic money supply reduces relative to
foreign money supply; if domestic output growth exceeds foreign output growth; and/or if domestic
inﬂation reduces relative to foreign inﬂation. It is interesting to determine how quickly Mozambican
exchange rates react to deviations from their long-run equlibrium implied in (15). In order to do
so, following the Engle-Granger methodology, we developed a short-run version of (15) by using
the rate of change of the variables and the error-correction mechanism (ECM) underlying (15).
Coeﬃcients of ECM terms are expected to provide information regarding the speed of adjustment
to the equilibrium. The ECM version of (15) is given by
∆et = θ1∆(mt − m∗
t)+θ2∆(yt − y∗
t)+θ3∆(pt − p∗
t)+θ4υt−1 + xt (16)
where ∆ denotes the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator, xt is a random error term and υt−1 is the one-period
lagged value of the error from the equilibrium regression (15). ECM equation (16) states that the rate
of change of the ratio of domestic-to-foreign fundamentals and also on the equilibrium error term.
If the equilibrium error term υt−1 is nonzero, then the model is out of equilibrium, which is likely to
happen in the short-run. Equation (16) is thus a short-run representation of our macro model (15).
Coeﬃcients θ1, θ2 and θ3 measure the impact of short-run changes of our macro fundamentals on
the exchange rate. Since θ4 is expected to be negative, the term θ4υt−1will be positive (negative)
if υt−1 is below (above) its equilibrium value (zero). Thus, the absolute value of θ4decides how
quickly the long-run equlibrium is restored.
4 Data and Stationarity Tests
We now turn to an empirical examination of (15), with a focus on coeﬃcient signs of the explanatory
variables, and predictive content relative to a naïve random walk. The data are quarterly observa-
tions for Mozambique (Moz), South Africa (SA), and the United States (US). The sample consists
of 56 observations, extending from the ﬁrst quarter of 1994 (coinciding with the liberalisation of
Mozambique’s currency market) to the fourth quarter of 2007. We consider South African and US
data because the rand and the dollar are the most important exchange rates in Mozambique. (The
rand due to close trade links with South Africa, which is the origin of approximately 30 percent of
Mozambique’s imports;8 and the dollar is the main reference currency for most currency transac-
tions.) Exchange rates are in units of metical per unit of foreign currency. The monetary variable
is M2. Price levels are measured by Consumer Price Indices (CPI). Output is measured by real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).9 Following Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983), the data are not adjusted for
8In comparison, Portugal (the former colony) and China account for approximately 4 and 3 percent, respectively,
of Mozambique’s imports. (Instituto Nacional de Estatística.)
9Mozambican data were obtained from Banco de Moçambique (Mozambique’s central bank) and Instituto Nacional
de Estatística; South African data from the South African Reserve Bank and Statistics South Africa; US data from
the Federal Reserve System (esp., Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the
Bureau for Labor Statistics.
6seasonality.
The data series are non-stationary (i.e. either the mean or the auto-covariances depend on the
date — see Hamilton (1994, chapter 3)). This is immediately apparent from visual examination of
the graphs in Appendix A, particularly for exchange rates, and the diﬀerences between domestic
and foreign money, and prices (all in natural log form). Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the
Dickey-Fuller unit root test for stationarity (Dickey and Fuller (1979), Harvey (1993), p. 130-131,
Hamilton (1994) chapter 17.)10
The levels test shows that, for all variables, the computed statistics are not more negative than
the critical values. They are, however, when in ﬁrst—diﬀerence form. We observe the same general
result when analysing the metical-dollar rate and associated explanatory variables.
The statistical tests conﬁrm that all series are I(1) — i.e. they are non-stationary, and become
stationary on ﬁrst diﬀerencing.
5 Regression results
Table 3 reports the cointegration and error correction regression results for our macro model with
monetary policy rules. Speciﬁcally, the table presents OLS estimates of the regressions





∆et = φ + θ1∆(mt − m∗
t)+θ2∆(yt − y∗
t)+θ3∆(pt − p∗
t)+θ4vt−1 + xt, (18)
where ∆denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, xt is a random error term and vt−1 is the one-period
lagged value of the error from the equilibrium regression (E17). For evaluation of our model’s
predictive performance, we also estimate a driftless random walk
et = et−1 + ut, (19)
where v and u are random disturbances (irregular components or measurement error). Regression
results for the random walk model are presented in Appendix D.
The dependent and explanatory variables are cointegrated if the residuals from these regressions
(which form a linear combination of the dependant and explanatory variables) are stationary, or
I(0). We can then conclude that there is a long-term relationship between the exchange rate and
macro fundamentals (rather than spurious correlations).
We test the residuals for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller
(1979), Harvey (1993), p. 132, Hamilton (1994) chapter 17, p. 501-502). Table 4 shows the results.
We conclude that the exchange rate and the macro fundamentals are cointegrated; thus the
regression coeﬃcients are statistically consistent. Notice that the coeﬃcient signs are consistent
with our expectations from theory. In the long run, faster economic growth in the domestic economy
generates an appreciation of the domestic currency; but faster increases in domestic money supply
or prices depreciate the currency. The in-sample ﬁt of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. Blue
lines (darker) are actual exchange rates; red lines (lighter) are model-estimated exchange rates
Considering that we do not use the lagged exchange rate as an explanatory variable, the in-sample
ﬁt is very high. (For comparison, see for example Frankel (2007).) Notice that the actual metical-
dollar exchange rate is smoother than the rate given by the estimated regression parameters. This is
somewhat unusual. Typically, exchange rates are more volatile than macroeconomic fundamentals,
which helps explain the poor empirical performance of macroeconomic models of exchange rate
determination.
10The statistical procedures employed here are standard, but note that there are fundamental diﬃculties to estab-
lishing whether a time series has a unit root on the basis of a ﬁnite sample of observations. (See Hamilton (1994), p.
444-445.)
7Table 3 also presents regression results for the ECM model. The results suggest that, for both
metical-dollar and metical-rand rates, the elasticity of exchange rate to macro-fundamentals is higher
in the long run (cointegrating regression) than in the short run (ECM), except for money supply
diﬀerentials (indeed, the coeﬃc i e n t so ft h er a t eo fc h a n g eo fm o n e ys u p p l yd i ﬀerentials have the
wrong sign). The ECM term, which is the key element in ECM models, behaves as expected and
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for both the metical-dollar and metical-rand rates. According to the
estimated ECM coeﬃcients, if the metical-dollar rate deviates from its equilibrium level in a given
quarter, 18% of such deviation would be corrected in the following quarter. In the case of the
metical-rand rate the adjustment would be smaller (13%), as implied by its ECM coeﬃcient.
6 Forecasting performance
S i n c eM e e s ea n dR o g o ﬀ (1983), forecasting ability has been the most common test of the performance
of an exchange rate model (Engel, Mark and West (2007)). We evaluate out-of-sample forecast
accuracy using the minimum mean square error criterion, and contrast the regression forecast root
mean square error (RMSE, henceforth) to that of the driftless random walk (Harvey (1993), p.33-34,
Nelson (1995). As a simple additional statistic, we also report the mean absolute percentage error
(MAPE).
The original regressions were estimated excluding the four last quarters in the data set. The
least-squares coeﬃcients were then used to obtain the exchange rate forecast for the next quarter,
using the actual values of the explanatory variable for this quarter (al aMeese and Rogoﬀ (1983)).
The exchange rate forecast is then added to the exchange rate series, and the procedure is repeated
for the each of the remaining out-of-sample quarters. The results are reported in Table 5.
The model’s forecast of the metical-rand exchange rate becomes more accurate than that of a
simple random walk at the four-quarter forecast horizon. That is, the ratio of the regression forecast
RMSE to the random walk RMSE goes from around 1.7 (one to three-quarter forecast) to 0.17 (four
quarters horizon). Figure 2a illustrates our ﬁndings for the metical-rand rate.
The same pattern is observed for the metical-dollar exchange rate, where we see that the fore-
casting accuracy of the regression model is poorer (in the sense of a larger RMSEs) than that of the
simple random walk at horizons from one to three quarters; but this is reversed at the fourth-quarter
horizon, where the model forecast has a lower MPSE than the random walk. See Figure 2b for an
illustration.
Our results indicate that macroeconomic fundamentals play a greater role in forecasting the
metical-rand and metical-dollar rates at medium-term to long horizons, rather than at short horizons.
Longer samples may permit further research and insights in the future.
Note that in most of the international literature on advanced economies, evidence of predictive
performance using monetary models requires substantially longer horizons. Nelson (1995) for exam-
ple, ﬁnds comparable improvements in forecasting accuracy (to a ratio of model forecast MPSE to
random walk forecast MPSE, of circa 0.50), only at the 16-quarter horizon.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Mozambique adopted a ﬂexible exchange rate regime in 1994. This paper develops and tests em-
pirically an analytic model for understanding the inﬂuence of macroeconomic (monetary) variables
on the free-ﬂoating value of the Mozambican currency. The model consists of a simple extension of
a standard monetary model of exchange rate determination, adapted to reﬂect salient features of a
ﬁnancially under-developed economy. Trade in goods is assumed to be a more signiﬁcant driver of
currency transactions than international capital market ﬂows; and the central bank, both domesti-
c a l l ya n di nt h ef o r e i g ne c o n o m y ,a r ea s s u m e dt op l a ya na c t i v er o l ei ns e t t i n gb e n c h m a r ki n t e r e s t
rates. Speciﬁcally, central banks follow interest rate rules, increasing (respectively, decreasing) the
8interest rate when the growth in domestic prices exceeds (is lower than) an inﬂation target; and
decreasing (increasing) the interest rate when economic growth is lower (higher) than desired.
Our results indicate a long-run relationship between metical exchange rates and the standard
monetary fundamentals (money and output), plus inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, faster economic growth
strengthens the value of the metical; but high inﬂation and/or monetary expansion weaken the
metical. Our empirical analysis conﬁrms these eﬀects for the two main exchange rate pairs for
Mozambique: the metical-dollar and metical-rand rates. In the medium to long-term, the positive
eﬀect of economic growth, and the negative eﬀect of inﬂation are particularly strong. Hence, policy
decisions which contribute to economic growth, while keeping inﬂation low, will have a positive
medium to long-term impact on the value of the currency.
Internationally, similar models of exchange rate determination typically perform worse than a
naïve “random walk” in predicting short-term (less than one year) and medium-term exchange rate
ﬂuctuations in rich economies and emerging markets. We examine an out-of-sample forecast horizon
of one to four quarters. We ﬁnd that the model predicts the metical-rand and metical-dollar rates
better than a random walk at the fourth-quarter horizon, but not at shorter horizons. We also ﬁnd
that the metical-dollar rate seems less variable than its fundamentals (as implied by the regression
model). One possible interpretation for this ﬁnding on the metical-dollar rate is that the metical-
dollar rate is better modelled as ﬂuctuating within an implicit (possibly varying) range, rather than
ﬂoating free of any oﬃcial intervention. This issue may be worth further investigation.
Lastly, note that previous research shows that inﬂa t i o ni nM o z a m b i q u ei sa ﬀected not only by
monetary aggregates, but also by climatic conditions aﬀecting agricultural output (Ubide (1997)).
Similarly, there will be factors beyond the control of economic policy makers which aﬀect the coun-
try’s rate of growth. This paper shows that these factors, through their eﬀects on output and
inﬂation, eventually contribute to movements in Mozambican exchange rates. Conversely, policy
decisions which contribute to economic growth, while keeping inﬂation low, will have a positive
medium to long-term impact on the value of the currency.
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Variable DF statistic 1% 5% 10% p-value 
Exchange Rate (MT/USD) -2.998  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.04
Domestic-Foreign M2 Ratio 0.452  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.98
Domestic-Foreign GDP Ratio -3.128  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.03
Domestic-Foreign CPI Ratio   -0.598  -3.573 -2.916 -2.598 0.86
Variable DF statistic 1% 5% 10% p-value 
Exchange Rate (MT/USD) -5.026  -3.557 -2.916 -2.596 0.00
Domestic-Foreign M2 Ratio -7.012  -3.557 -2.916 -2.596 0.00
Domestic-Foreign GDP Ratio -6.029  -3.557 -2.917 -2.596 0.00
Domestic-Foreign CPI Ratio   -5.872  -3.557 -2.917 -2.596 0.00
First Differences Test
Critical Values 
Table 2: Stationarity Test: Natural Log of MT/USD Rate
Levels Test
Critical Values 
Variable (Log of)  DF statistic 1% 5% 10% p-value 
Exchange rate (MT/ZAR)  -1.884  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.34
Domestic-Foreign M2 Ratio -1.471  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.54
Domestic-Foreign GDP Ratio -2.095  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.25
Domestic-Foreign CPI Ratio -1.603  -3.555 -2.916 -2.596 0.47
Variable (Log of) DF statistic 1% 5% 10% p-value 
Exchange Rate (MT/ZAR) -6.521  -3.557 -2.916 -2.596 0.00
Domestic-Foreign M2 Ratio -7.464  -3.557 -2.917 -2.596 0.00
Domestic-Foreign GDP Ratio -6.908  -3.557 -2.917 -2.596 0.00























Table 5: Forecast Evaluation
Forecasting
Horizon MT/USD MT/ZAR MT/USD  MT/ZAR
In-Sample (RMSE) 0.059 0.064 0.443  0.201
1 quarter  0.052 0.070 0.020  0.040
2 quarters 0.078 0.057 0.059  0.033
3 quarters 0.121 0.051 0.100  0.030
4 quarters 0.127 0.020 0.210  0.120
1 quarter  0.510 0.859 0.200  0.486
2 quarters 0.763 0.692 0.582  0.406
3 quarters 1.191 0.617 0.985  0.364
4 quarters 1.261 0.245 2.080  1.466
1 – No intercept 
RMSE
Random walk 
1  IRR Monetary Model
MAPE
Model  DF statistic  1% 5% 10% p-value 
MT/USD -3.55  -3.56 -2.92 -2.60 0.01
MT/ZAR -3.20  -3.56 -2.92 -2.60 0.03
Table 4: Stationarity Test on Residuals
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with Intercept 
Critical Values 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5% and 10%, respectively.
1 - Variables from the cointegrating regression enter in first differences and cointegrating residuals enter with one lag. 
coef.  p-value  coef. p-value coef. p-value coef.  p-value 
yt –  * y   t      
 
 
m – m * 
-1.14  *** 0.000 -0.78  *** 0.000 -0.60 *** 0.000 -0.64 *** 0.000
t     t  
  p –  *
  0.32  *** 0.001 0.17  ** 0.028 -0.36 *** 0.000 -0.30 *** 0.000
t     p   t  
  v 1
0.19  * 0.062 0.58  *** 0.000 0.07 0.269 0.16 **  0.035
t-  
 
  ------- -------  ------- ------- -0.18 *** 0.001 -0.13 *** 0.004
Constant  -3.94  0.014 0.66  0.266 0.02 0.000 0.01 0.000
Adj-R2   0.98  0.92  0.88 0.92
F Test 973  *** 0.000 217  *** 0.000 100 *** 0.000 167 *** 0.000
Observations  56  56  55 55
Cointegrating Regression Error Correction Regression 1 
et=MT/USD et=MT/ZAR  et=MT/USD et=MT/ZAR
Table 3: Cointegration and Error Correction Model - Regression Results 
 
 
13Figure 1: In-Sample Fit 
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A1: Mozambican Metical -South African Rand Data 
 
  
Figure 2: First Differences of Log MT/ZAR Rate 
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Figure 1: Natural Log of MT/ZAR Rate
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Figure 4: First Differences of Log GDP Ratio Moz-SA
1994I-2007IV
Data Source: Banco de Mocambique
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Figure 3: Log of Mozambique/South Africa GDP Ratio
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Figure 5: Log of M2 Ratio Moz-SA
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APPENDIX B: MULTICOLLINEARITY 
  
A variance inflation test shows that none of the explanatory variables in the model 
has a variance inflation factor larger than 10, except for the ratio of domestic to US 
price level, which is above 10. (As a common rule of thumb, we regard the model as 










APPENDIX C: FUNDAMENTALS  
Model MT/ZAR  Model MT/USD 
 
Variable  VIF  1/VIF Variable VIF  1/VIF
ln(m/m 
*  ) 4.06 0.246108 ln(m/m
*) 5.46 0.183171
ln(y/y 
*  ) 2.93  0.340768 ln(y/y 
*) 5.20  0.192247
ln(p/p*)  2.70 0.370288 ln(p/p*) 12.45  0.080318
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Figure 18: relationship between MT/USD and Moz to US Figure  17: relationship between MT/USD and  MOZ to US 
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Table 6: Cointegrating Regression Results
 
Coef.  p-value  Coef.  p-value Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
yt – yt* -1.14*** 0.000  -0.78*** 0.000  ------- ------- ------- -------
mt – mt*  0.32***  0.001   0.17**  0.028  ------- ------- ------- -------
pt – pt*  0.19*  0.062   0.58***  0.000  ------- ------- ------- -------
et-1   ------- -------  ------- ------- 1.00*** 0.000 1.00***  0.000 
Constant -3.94 0.014   0.66  0.266  ------- ------- ------- -------
     Adj-R2   0.98   0.92  0.98 0.87 
F Test   973***  0.000   217***  0.000  ------- ------- ------- -------
Observations 56   56  55  55 
 
et = MT/USD  et = MT/ZAR et = MT/ZAR 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
et = MT/USD 
IRR Monetary Model Random Walk  
20